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" The snake, tradition's tale avers,  
 " Shifts, once a year, his speckled skin ;  
 " But *no improvement* change infers :  
 " He's still the self same snake within."

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## SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PISTOLLING PRIVY-COUNSELLORS.—In my last Number, at page 516, I inserted the Letter of Lord Castlereagh, containing his Charges against Mr. Canning ; and, therefore, justice demands, that I here insert, in like manner, Mr. Canning's Defence ; when I have done which, I shall offer such further observations as occur to me upon this at once ludicrous and scandalous transaction.

" It is perfectly true, that so long ago as Easter, Mr. Canning had represented to the Duke of Portland the insufficiency (in his opinion) of the Government, as then constituted, to carry on the affairs of the country, under all the difficulties of the times, and had requested that, unless some change should be effected in it, he might be permitted to resign his office. It is equally true that in the course of the discussion which arose out of this representation, it was proposed to Mr. Canning, and accepted by him, as the condition of his consenting to retain the seals of the Foreign office, that a change should be made in the War Department.—But it is *not true* that the time at which that change was ultimately proposed to be made, was of Mr. Canning's choice ; and it is not true that he was party or consenting to the concealment of that intended change from Lord Castlereagh.—With respect to the concealment, Mr. Canning, some short time previous to the date of Lord Castlereagh's letter, without the smallest suspicion of the existence of any intention on the part of Lord Castlereagh to make such an appeal to Mr. Canning as that letter contains, but upon information that some misapprehension did exist as to Mr. Canning's supposed concurrence in the reserve which had been practised towards Lord Castlereagh, transmitted to one of Lord Castlereagh's most intimate friends, to be communicated whenever he might think proper, the copy of a letter addressed by Mr.

Canning to the Duke of Portland, in the month of July, in which Mr. Canning requests, 'in justice to himself, that it may be remembered, whenever hereafter this concealment shall be alledged (as he doubts not that it will) against him, as an act of injustice towards Lord Castlereagh, that it *did not originate in his suggestion* ; that so far from desiring it, he conceived, however erroneously, Lord Camden to be the sure channel of communication to Lord Castlereagh ; and that up to a very late period he believed such communication to have been actually made.'—The copy of this letter, and of the Duke of Portland's answer to it, 'acknowledging Mr. Canning's repeated remonstrances against the concealment,' are still in the possession of Lord Castlereagh's friend.—The communication to Lord Camden, to which this letter refers, was made on the 28th of April, with Mr. Canning's knowledge, and at his particular desire. Lord Camden being the near connection and most confidential friend of Lord Castlereagh, it never occurred to Mr. Canning, nor was it credible to him, till he received the most positive asseverations of the fact, that Lord Camden had kept back such a communication from Lord Castlereagh.—With respect to the period at which the change in the War Department was to take place, Mr. Canning was induced, in the first instance, to consent to its postponement till the rising of parliament, partly by the representations made to himself of the inconveniencies of any change in the middle of a Session, but principally from a consideration of the particular circumstances under which Lord Castlereagh stood in the House of Commons after Easter ; circumstances which would have given to his removal at that period of the Session, a character which it was certainly no part of Mr. Canning's wish that it should bear.—Mr. Canning, however, received the most positive promise, that a change in the War Department

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“ should take place immediately upon the  
 “ close of the Session. When that time  
 “ arrived, the earnest and repeated en-  
 “ treaties of most of Lord Castlereagh’s  
 “ friends in the Cabinet, were employed  
 “ to prevail upon Mr. Canning to consent  
 “ to the postponement of the arrange-  
 “ ment.—At length, and most reluctant-  
 “ ly, he did give his consent to its being  
 “ postponed to the period proposed by  
 “ Lord Castlereagh’s friends, viz. the ter-  
 “ mination of the Expedition then in pre-  
 “ paration; but he did so upon the most  
 “ distinct and solemn assurances, that  
 “ whatever might be the issue of the Ex-  
 “ pedition, the change should take place  
 “ at that period; that the Seals of the  
 “ War Department should then be offered  
 “ to Lord Wellesley (the person for whose  
 “ accession to the Cabinet, Mr. Canning  
 “ was known to be most anxious), and that  
 “ the interval should be diligently em-  
 “ ployed by Lord Castlereagh’s friends,  
 “ in preparing Lord Castlereagh’s mind  
 “ to acquiesce in such an arrangement.—  
 “ It was therefore matter of astonishment  
 “ to Mr. Canning, when, at the issue of  
 “ the Expedition, he reminded the Duke  
 “ of Portland, that the time was now come  
 “ for his Grace’s writing to Lord Welles-  
 “ ley, to find, that so far from the interval  
 “ having been employed by Lord Castle-  
 “ reagh’s friends, in preparing Lord Castle-  
 “ reagh for the change, the same reserve  
 “ had been continued towards him, against  
 “ which Mr. Canning had before so  
 “ earnestly remonstrated. Being inform-  
 “ ed of this circumstance, by the Duke  
 “ of Portland, and learning at the same  
 “ time from his Grace, that there were  
 “ other difficulties attending the pro-  
 “ mised arrangement of which Mr. Can-  
 “ ning had not before been apprised;  
 “ and that the Duke of Portland had him-  
 “ self come to a determination to retire  
 “ from office, Mr. Canning instantly, and  
 “ before any step whatever had been taken  
 “ towards carrying the promised arrange-  
 “ ment into effect, withdrew his claim, and  
 “ requested the Duke of Portland to tender  
 “ his (Mr. Canning’s) resignation, at the  
 “ same time with his Grace’s, to the King.  
 “ This was on Wednesday the 6th of  
 “ September, previously to the Levee of  
 “ that day.—All question of the perform-  
 “ ance of the promise made to Mr. Can-  
 “ ning being thus at an end, the reserve  
 “ which Lord Castlereagh’s friends had  
 “ hitherto so perseveringly practised to-  
 “ wards Lord Castlereagh appears to have

“ been laid aside. Lord Castlereagh was  
 “ now made acquainted with the nature of  
 “ the arrangement which had been intended  
 “ to have been proposed to him. What  
 “ may have been the reasons which pre-  
 “ vented Lord Castlereagh’s friends from  
 “ fulfilling the assurances given to Mr.  
 “ Canning that Lord Castlereagh’s mind  
 “ should be prepared by their communi-  
 “ cations for the arrangement intended to  
 “ be carried into effect; and what the  
 “ motives for the disclosure to Lord Cas-  
 “ tlereagh after that arrangement had  
 “ ceased to be in contemplation, it is not  
 “ for Mr. Canning to explain.”

This defence appeared first in the *Morning Chronicle*, a circumstance which (joined with others to be noticed by-and-by) is, as to the views of Mr. Canning, very well worthy of notice.—As an answer to Lord Castlereagh’s charge this paper amounts to just nothing at all. A man who is a tolerable master of words, may so confuse any statement of facts as to raise out of it a question for dispute amongst persons, not accustomed to reason, or, not naturally of very clear heads; and, such is the device to which the “ Captain of Eton” has now had recourse. He has laboured hard to “ be-bother” the matter, and, has, in some measure, succeeded; but, I think, I may venture to say, that he has not produced the slightest alteration in the before-formed opinion of any man of even common discernment. We have nothing here but quibbling and shuffling; and not a single fact of any importance, nor a single argument to remove the charge, which it was the object of the statement to remove.—In the bother-brain letter of my Lord Castlereagh we find, after a great deal of labour to get at the true meaning; after sifting and boulding this confused heap of verbosity, we find Mr. Canning charged with *underhand dealing*; we find him charged with *having*, UNKNOWN TO LORD CASTLEREAGH, obtained from the Duke of Portland, a positive promise that Lord Castlereagh should be put out of his place; and, having, while he carried this promise in his pocket, continued, for many months, not only to be one of the same ministry with Lord Castlereagh, but to act towards that Lord with all the appearances of cordiality.—Such is the charge which Lord Castlereagh prefers against Mr. Canning; and to me it does not appear, that the charge is removed, or, in the smallest degree, weakened, by what the latter has, in the paper above inserted, urged by way of defence.—Mr. CANNING acknowledges.



that, at Easter, he did obtain from the Duke of Portland, a positive promise that Lord Castlereagh should be put out of his office; and, he also acknowledges, *that he himself did not*, either before or after this application was made *and this promise obtained*, communicate either his intentions or his acts (relating to this matter) to Lord Castlereagh.

—This was an underhand proceeding; it was a foul and unmanly intrigue; it was like what one reads of in the anecdotes of the court of Russia; it was, as Lord Castlereagh characterized it, deceitful, and marked with the very worst features of bad faith. —As to the *time* when the promise was to be put into execution; and, as to his remonstrance to the Duke of Portland respecting the communication of the matter to Lord Castlereagh; as to all these excuses, what do they make in his favour? It was for him to communicate, not *his application* to the Duke of Portland, but his *intention* to make that application; and this he should have communicated to Lord Castlereagh before he took even the most trifling step towards his removal. —Mr. Canning says, that he neither suggested the concealment, nor approved of it; no, but the sin is a sin of consent, and consent he most assuredly did, according to a fair and honest interpretation of the meaning of that word. No, says he, for I “repeatedly remonstrated” against the concealment. —Now, observe: he states, that, in the month of *July*, more, perhaps, than *three months* after he obtained a **positive** promise that Lord Castlereagh should be put out of his office, he wrote a letter to the Duke of Portland, requesting, “that, when, hereafter, the concealment should be alledged against him, it might be remembered, that the concealment did not originate in his suggestion; that he conceived Lord Camden to be the sure channel of communication to Lord Castlereagh, and that, up to a late period, he believed such communication to have been actually made.” —Here is a distinct avowal, that, in *July*, three months after he had obtained the promise for putting Lord Castlereagh out of his place, he knew that the fact had been, and still was, *concealed from Lord Castlereagh*. —What nonsense is it, then, to talk of his not having suggested the concealment; of his not having desired it; and of his having remonstrated against it; when he knew that the concealment did exist, and when he had it completely

in his own power to do it away, at any moment? Remonstrances, indeed! Why, he may as well tell us of his remonstrances against people for bidding him not eat his dinner. He would eat it, in spite of their commands; and he would have made the communication to Lord Castlereagh, if he had wished the communication to be made to him. We remonstrate with people for doing that which we have not the power at hand to prevent them from doing; or, for leaving undone that which we cannot easily compel them to do; but, who ever heard of a remonstrance like that of Mr. Canning? Really, for me to remonstrate against my neighbour at table for not moving my jaws for me would not be much less absurd. He would fain have the world believe, that he was no party to the concealment. He perceives the shabby figure he makes under that imputation, of which, therefore, he is anxious to get rid: but, before he can make any man of common sense believe, that he is innocent of the charge, he must prove himself utterly unable to *speak* or to *write*; for, until then, his mouth will always be closed with this question: “Why, when you knew that concealment had taken place during three months, did not you, with your own tongue, remove that concealment, as any fair-dealing man would have done?” —The letter written to the Duke of Portland in *July*, instead of being a proof of innocence, contains proof of conscious guilt, on the part of Mr. Canning, who was evidently alarmed at the probable consequences of the concealment, and who in this letter, endeavoured to provide himself beforehand, with an excuse for his conduct, a scheme quite worthy of its author. —To pretend, that he ever believed Lord Castlereagh to have been informed of the promise made to him (Canning) is, really, what one would not have expected even from him. He had, from Easter to Michaelmas, been in possession of a positive promise, that one of his colleagues should be put out of his place; he continues, during the whole of that time, to act with that colleague, to sit in council with him, and says not a word to him upon the subject of his complaint against him; and, at the end of the time he pretends to be astonished, that no one had informed his said colleague of what he himself had done against him. To make this asser-

tion demanded as much confidence in the maker, or as much contempt, in him, for the public, as any assertion that I have met with. It is quite useless to dwell upon this part of the statement; for it is what no man in his senses will believe.—When you see men “go about the bush,” as the saying is; when they deal in circumlocutions instead of names; when you see them resort to all manner of means of avoiding direct assertion, and of reserving a hole to creep out at; when you see them at this work, you may be quite certain, that their cause is a bad one. Of this description is the statement of Mr. Canning, which, while it seems to point at Lord Camden, cannot be said to *assert*, that Lord Camden undertook to make the communication to Lord Castlereagh. It says, that Mr. Canning “*conceived* Lord Camden to be the sure channel of communication to Lord Castlereagh.” Then again it states, that a knowledge of the *promise*, made by the Duke of Portland to Mr. Canning, was communicated to Lord Camden by Mr. Canning’s desire, on the 28th of April; and that “Lord Camden being the near connection and most confidential friend of Lord Castlereagh, it never occurred to Mr. Canning, nor was it credible to him, till he received the most positive asseverations of the fact, that Lord Camden had *kept back* such communication from Lord Castlereagh.”—But, if you requested the thing to be communicated to Lord Camden, with what view was it? Was it with a view, that it might thus reach Lord Castlereagh? Oh! miserable shift! If this had been your wish, how came you not to make the communication yourself? How came you, when, in July, you found the communication had not been made, not to make it yourself then?—But, what says Lord Camden to this? What says he, in answer to the charge of having been the cause of that concealment, of which Lord Castlereagh complains, and for which he demanded satisfaction? Why, he *denies the fact*. This is his statement.—“As it may be inferred, from a statement which has appeared in the public papers, that Lord Camden *withheld* from Lord Castlereagh a communication *which he had been desired to make to him*, it is necessary that it should be understood, that; however Mr. Canning might have *conceived* the communication alluded to, to have been made to Lord Camden, it was never stated to Lord Camden, that the com-

munication was made *at the desire of Mr. Canning*; and, that so far from Lord Camden having been *authorised to make the communication to Lord Castlereagh*, he was *absolutely restricted from so doing*.—As it may also be inferred, that Lord Camden was expected to prepare Lord Castlereagh’s mind for any proposed change, it is necessary that it should be understood, that Lord Camden *never engaged to communicate to Lord Castlereagh any circumstances respecting it, before the termination of the Expedition*.—If what Lord Camden says be true, what Mr. Canning has said, upon this part of the subject, *must be false*, unless the Duke of Portland deceived Mr. Canning upon the point, that is to say, gave him untrue information, or, in other words, *stated falsehoods to him*.—Which of the three are we to believe? For my part, I believe Lord Camden, because it appears quite out of nature, that he should have concealed the fact from Lord Castlereagh, if he had not been restricted from communicating it to him; and, besides, whatever we may think of the conduct of Lord Camden, it is evident that Lord Castlereagh regards him not as a party offending in a very high degree.—In fact, if there could be hatched, by any means whatever, a plausible reason for Mr. Canning’s leaving the task of communication to a third person, his friends might have some hope of seeing him ride off over the Duke of Portland, by whom, of course, Lord Camden means that he was “*absolutely restricted*” from *making the communication to Lord Castlereagh*; and thus the whole of the blame would fall, at last, upon a poor old man, who, as the public papers inform us, *is upon his death-bed*! Castlereagh charges Canning with concealing from him the fact of his having obtained a promise from the Duke of Portland to put him (Castlereagh) out of his place: Canning throws the blame upon Lord Camden, who, as he leaves us to infer, was put in possession of the fact, by the Duke of Portland, for the purpose of communicating it to Lord Castlereagh: Lord Camden then comes forward, and avers, that, so far from his being authorized to communicate the fact to Lord Castlereagh, he was *absolutely restricted from doing it*. Lord Camden and Mr. Canning may, as to this point, both speak truth; but, in that case, the Duke of Portland must have given Mr. Canning *false information*: for Mr. Canning asserts, that he firmly



believed, that, in consequence of the communication of the fact to Lord Camden, by the Duke of Portland, that fact was communicated to Lord Castlereagh, and that he could not possibly believe, that Lord Camden had *kept back* the communication from Lord Castlereagh, till he received the most positive asseverations of the fact. If, therefore, we believe Lord Camden, the question of *veracity* lies between the Duke of Portland and Mr. Canning, the former of whom, in closing his political career, will, at any rate, leave to the noblemen of England a pretty good lesson upon the subject of choosing their companions in power.—But, in whatever way this question of veracity may be settled, Mr. Canning stands, *upon his own confession*, charged with having obtained from the Duke of Portland a positive promise to turn out Lord Castlereagh, without having communicated his intention to Lord Castlereagh; of having suffered the fact of the promise to lie *concealed from all the world*, from Easter to the 28th of April; of *never having, from first to last, spoken to Lord Castlereagh upon the subject*; and, moreover, it does not appear, that, at any stage of the business, *he ever did request any person whatever* to make the communication to Lord Castlereagh.—Here, as far as relates to his conduct towards Lord Castlereagh, is the whole case. It cannot be mended, and, I am sure, it cannot be made worse. It exhibits an intrigue of the worst and lowest sort; and, besides its own intrinsic demerits, it tends to *fix upon the author of it, the imputation of other intrigues*, his share in which has, by many persons, at least, been hitherto considered as doubtful.—As to the manner, in which the *country* has been treated by Mr. Canning, in this instance, I think the less of it, because, were the treatment ten thousand times worse, the country would richly deserve it, seeing that it is entirely owing to its want of spirit, to its base abandonment of its ancient character, that such a man, and that this particular man, has had it in his power to injure and insult it.—Can any one believe, that, had the English nation been what it was only thirty years ago, this man would ever have conceived the audacious idea of becoming its prime minister; that is to say, in fact, its chief ruler? No: if England had been what it was but twenty years ago, it is not to be believed, that any man, capable of such an intrigue, would have found his way into the king's

council; and much less is it to be believed, that any cabinet minister, that a Secretary of State for foreign affairs, would, after having obtained a positive promise for the dismissal of the Secretary of the War department (a promise which must have been demanded upon the ground of the *unfitness* of the latter for that important office), remain in the same ministry, for six months afterwards, with the person against whom the promise was to operate. It is not to be believed, that any man would have dared to do such a thing in England, only twenty years ago. The treatment of his colleague, whom he had doomed to expulsion, was bad enough; but what can atone for his treatment of the country; that country from which he has, for so many years, been receiving such immense sums of money, and on which, not content with his own salaries and sinecures, he has not scrupled to quarter his relations.—The only ground, upon which he, or his friends, will dare to set up a defence of his conduct in *asking* for the putting out of Castlereagh, must be that he thought Castlereagh unfit for the post that he filled. Indeed, this is his own defence. His proposition was grounded upon the "*insufficiency of the government, as then constituted, to carry on the affairs of the country, under all the difficulties of the times.*" It was then, he says, proposed to him that the change should be made in the War-department; and, with this he was satisfied; whence it naturally follows, that, in his opinion, the *insufficiency* lay in the War-department; that is to say, *in Lord Castlereagh*. This is conclusive: it is here upon his own confession, that, so conspicuous was the insufficiency of this Secretary for the War-department, that the *whole government* became thereby inadequate to the carrying on of the affairs of the country, under all the difficulties of the times. Well; with this fearful conviction in his mind, what does this servant and sworn adviser of the king do? Why, he, without any representation to the king or his council, suffers this insufficient minister to remain in his post; he himself continues, not only by his still being one of the ministry, but by his declarations in parliament, to support a ministry, which, as then constituted, he regarded as insufficient for carrying on the affairs of the country; and, which adds greatly to his demerit as towards the public, he stands silently by, and sees this insufficient war-minister, whose insufficiency

was such as to be contagious; he stands by, laughing in his sleeve, and sees this man plan, and put into execution, a measure of warfare of greater magnitude and of greater risk than any that had been undertaken during the whole of the war, and, indeed, greater than any which this country had ever known; a measure which gave employment to a hundred thousand men, and which would naturally cost several millions of money. This he stands by and suffers to pass unopposed, though he had declared the war-minister to be insufficient for his post; and, yet he has, even after this, the assurance to put forward claims to public confidence!—Mr. Worthington has very forcibly observed upon the utter disrespect, not to say downright contempt, of *the king*, and the *kingly office*, exhibited in the conduct of Mr. Canning, through the whole of this proceeding. We have been taught to believe, that *the king chose his own servants and dismissed again when he pleased*; and, it will be recollected, that the ministry, to which Mr. Canning belonged, did, at their coming into office, most distinctly maintain this doctrine. But, here we see, that the dismissal of Lord Castlereagh is agreed upon; Mr. Canning obtains a *positive promise*, that he shall be dismissed; and all this without the king having any thing more to do with the matter than one of his cream-coloured horses has. The king confides in Lord Castlereagh for the planning and the executing of measures of the greatest importance; and, all the while, Mr. Canning has doomed that he shall have his place taken from him. The king looks upon Lord Castlereagh as one of his confidential servants; he entrusts him with most important secrets of state; he sits at the same council-board with him, and is, in part at least, directed by his advice; and, all this while, Mr. Canning, *unknown to the king*, carries in his pocket the positive promise, that Lord Castlereagh shall be turned out of the service of the king, a promise, which, as Mr. Canning now says, was demanded from the conviction of the said Lord's being *unfit for his place*. There appears to have been no appeal made to the king, at any stage of the business. The proposition is made and acceded to; the promise takes place and is broken; there are six months of undermining and chaffering; first Lord Castlereagh is to be put out at one time, then at another time; and, during the whole of it, the king is never once consulted, nor is the thing ever

mentioned to him; and, in fact, it was, as to this great prerogative of dismissing and choosing ministers, Mr. Canning who was acting in the capacity of king!—While this intrigue was going on, the Marquis Wellesley was, as the reader will call to mind, kept dancing backwards and forwards between London and Portsmouth; and, from the dates, it necessarily follows, that, when Lord Wellesley was sent out to Spain, it was agreed upon between Mr. Canning and the Duke of Portland, that he should, in a very short time, *perhaps in ten days*, be sent for back again to fill the place of Lord Castlereagh. I am not of opinion, as some persons appear to be, that the cause in Spain suffered from this delay; because, I am thoroughly persuaded, that, as far as the aiding of that cause went, Mr. Frere, the Anti-Jacobin poet, was just as likely to succeed as the Marquis Wellesley. Therefore, my ground of complaint, as to the sending of the Marquis out, is different from that taken by some others. I blame Mr. Canning, who was Secretary for foreign affairs, and who, of course, selected the Marquis for the embassy to Spain, for sending him out at the very time when he was in almost daily expectation of seeing Lord Castlereagh put out of that place at home, which he had destined the Marquis to fill. He must, supposing his brain not to have been quite turned by ambition, have known that Lord Wellesley could do no good in Spain; and, it really appears now, that he sent him off thither for the sole purpose of better disguising his views at home; and for this the country will have to pay, first or last, not less, perhaps, than two hundred thousand pounds; but that, and much more, it richly deserves. I do not pity the country. It deserves all the injuries and all the insults that have been heaped upon it; but, that is no justification of Mr. Canning, who, at every new view of him, assumes a deeper die. He seems to have formed a very correct idea of the spirit, or, rather, the baseness, of the country, when he says, that he should have insisted upon Lord Castlereagh's dismissal *during the last session of parliament* had he not been apprehensive that the dismissal would have been attributed by the public to the share which Lord Castlereagh had had in bargaining for seats and votes in parliament. This is excessively impudent. He has no scruple to revive the memory of those scandalous transactions, and to tell the public, that he, for his part, did not wish them to be



lieve, that Lord Castlereagh was dismissed on account of his having grossly violated *their* rights; for having committed an outrageous offence against *them*. The words are these: "Mr. Canning was induced to consent to the postponement of Lord Castlereagh's dismissal, till the rising of parliament, *principally* from a consideration of the particular circumstances under which Lord Castlereagh stood in the House of Commons after Easter; circumstances which would have given to his removal, at that period of the session, a character, which it was certainly no part of Mr. Canning's wish that it should bear." Upon this impudent passage the Times news-paper has the following remarks; "Here then is the ingenuous and manly simplicity of a magnanimous statesman; to rescue, by your public voice, an obnoxious Minister from the just indignation of his country, at the moment that you have secretly doomed him to be the victim of a dark and insidious intrigue; to vindicate the very act by which he had merited degradation, at the time that you are determined upon his disgrace; to avow his innocence while you are plotting his destruction! Display your stores, ye accumulated treasures of ancient guile, and shew us whether they contain a fraud like this!" But, what I wish to imprint upon the mind of the indignant reader is this; that Mr. Canning, who and whose relations were receiving such sums annually from the public purse, from the taxes raised upon the people; that this Mr. Canning, being, as he now declares, fully convinced, that the insufficiency of Lord Castlereagh rendered the whole government, as it then stood, inadequate to the carrying on the affairs of the country, did nevertheless agree to let him remain in place, lest that people, that injured people, should conceive, that he was removed from that place on account of his offences against *them*. There has seldom, and, perhaps, never, been an insult like this offered to any nation upon earth; yet, should I not be at all surprized to see this same man again in power, in the space of a few months, in company with the present Opposition, or, at least, with some of them. It cannot have escaped those who are in the habit of observing the conduct of the parties in the House of Commons, that the Opposition have always appeared to have, in their censure of the ministry, a good deal of reserve, with re-

gard to Mr. Canning. They have always spoken of him with some degree of mildness, and, often, with respect, making Mr. Perceval and Lord Castlereagh the objects of their unqualified censure. I believe, that, from the time that the last change of ministry took place, there has been a growing intrigue between *some* of them and Mr. Canning; and, I further believe, that the plan was, first to introduce Lord Wellesley, and then, at a convenient time, for him and Mr. Canning to join in insisting upon *further changes*, by the means of which a ministry would have been formed to the exclusion of all those, in both parties, who were likely to stand in the way of Mr. Canning's ambitious views. It is true, that, by such means, he would not have mounted to the top of the tree at once; but, having got rid of all those rivals, who are of nearly his own age, he would have trusted to time for the rest; or, at any rate, he would have made his ground sure against the arrival of any of those events, which would naturally put the existence of the present ministry to hazard.—For the same reasons, I now expect to see him join in the Opposition to the present ministry. Not all at once, perhaps; but by degrees, as his great master Pitt joined in the Opposition against Mr. Addington. Mr. Canning saw, that, while the ministry continued constituted as it was during last winter and last summer, he could never get to the head of it, there being no less than three in his way, namely Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Perceval, and Lord Castlereagh. The two former were too firmly rooted to afford him any hope of their removal, for the present, and until he acquired additional strength; but, the latter, never a favourite of any body, except for special and temporary purposes, had been shaken almost to the ground by the recent detections and exposures, and had, in fact, been propped up by Mr. Canning himself, only, as it now appears, for the purpose of making his fall the work of the latter's own hand. It was at this moment, having just propped him for a little, that he demanded his ejection from office, being ready, no doubt, in case things had taken a more popular turn in the House of Commons, to have made a great merit of this demand.—That the demand arose wholly from an intriguing motive, there can, I think, be no doubt at all: for, as to ability in conducting the War department, *when* had Mr. Canning

discovered any want of that in his colleague? There had been no warlike measure, under the administration of Lord Castlereagh, which Mr. Canning had not publicly defended in the most strenuous manner. No one can have forgotten the part he took in defending the expedition under Sir John Moore; and, indeed, it is perfectly well known, that of that most unfortunate measure, he and his friend Mr. Hookham Frere were the principal cause. He had seen the expedition to Portugal and that to Spain; he had seen another expedition sent out under Sir Arthur Wellesley; of all these he had, over and over again, expressed his decided approbation; and, he never did, it seems, discover any want of *sufficiency* in the ministry, of which he formed a part, until Lord Castlereagh was detected in having bargained for votes and seats in the house of Commons. Then it was, and not till then, that he discovered an insufficiency in the ministry as then constituted, and that that insufficiency lay in the war department. He had, upon numerous occasions, when the charge of insufficiency was preferred against the ministry, resented that charge in the most bitter terms; nay, by a reference to the Debates, it will be seen, that he was loudly defying those, who preferred the charge, at the very time, or, at least, within two days of the time, and frequently *after* the time, when, as he now unblushingly states, he was making a representation, to the Duke of Portland, of the existence of this insufficiency; that is to say, was complaining in private of the lamentable existence of that the existence of which he was stoutly denying in public, and that, too, in his double capacity of member of parliament and adviser of the king.—It is quite useless to pursue these observations any farther; it being, I think, quite manifest, that the reason alledged by Mr. Canning for the removal of Lord Castlereagh was a mere pretence, and that the real motive was, the getting rid of a rival, who had just then luckily become an object of pretty general censure. If the reader be, as, I think, he must be, satisfied that this was the fact, where will he find words adequate to a description of the conduct and character of the man, who, after having so acted, and from such a motive, now, in the stils of candour and magnanimity, pretends that he *did not wish to take advantage* of the circumstances under which Lord Castlereagh then stood

in the House of Commons; and who has now the audacity thus to insult the public, in order the more effectually to disguise the motive of his intrigue?—With respect to the *change in the ministry*, which has grown out of this intrigue, I am of opinion, that, as far as it has hitherto gone, it is, by no means, a change for the worse, notwithstanding all that the Morning Chronicle is pleased to say about the *loss* sustained in the withdrawing of Mr. Canning's *intellect*; for, I cannot but remember, that it was Mr. Canning who selected Mr. Hookham Frere for the embassy "*near his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII.*" which Mr. Frere was assisted by that *Monsieur Charmilly*, of whom such memorable mention is made in the complaining dispatches of the unfortunate Sir J. Moore; nor can I so soon forget Mr. Canning's harangues, amongst the Jews and Contractors, respecting the wars in Spain and in Austria, and his famous manifesto about the *Universal Spanish nation*. Indeed (and I hope the public will bear it in mind) it is, as a matter of course, this *very* Mr. Canning, who has had the management of the whole of our connection with Spain, since the commencement of her revolution. It is he, in fact, who *fashioned the cause*, for which we are contending in Spain, and in which contest so much English blood, and English resources, of all sorts, have been wasted. It is he, to whom, principally at least, is to be attributed the stupid and fatal notion, that, without a total change in the country, a disposition would be found, in the people of Spain, to resist Buonaparté. It was he, who, as minister for foreign affairs, must, in a more especial manner, have held England back, kept her aloof from the cause of the Spanish nation, until those spirited bodies, the provincial Juntas, had been put down, and one General Body, that wanted all the good, and that was wanting in none of the evils, of those separate bodies, had been established. From that moment; from the moment that the influence of English councils superceded that of the spontaneous and vigorous, though irregular and, perhaps, democratical, influence of the provincial Juntas; from that moment began the extinguishment of the spirit of resistance in Spain. The operation of this influence, on the part of our government, it was that enabled Joseph Buonaparté to reach Madrid; and, for the use of this influence we and the Spaniards have to thank Mr. Canning. His colleagues are

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to blame too; but, they are, in this respect, to blame only, perhaps, because they suffered him to follow his own inclination. When, therefore, one looks back at what Spain was, at the time when all those spirited Addresses were issuing from the several Juntas; when one reflects, not only on what might have been done by us, but on what was actually pointed out by many persons (and by myself amongst the rest) as proper to be done; when one compares the probable result, in such case, to the result that will now inevitably take place; and, especially when one takes into account the monstrous waste of means, the dreadful loss of lives, the almost indescribable human misery that has been endured, that is still to be endured, and the vast mass of disgrace, of all sorts, which this country has to sustain: when one takes a view of all this, and considers, that of producing all this Mr. Canning has been the principal cause, one must be of an uncommonly patient disposition not to resent the affront that is offered to one's understanding by those, who affect to see, in the resignation, or turning-out, of that minister, a loss of capacity to the cabinet. *Intellect* Mr. Canning has; but, it is, in my opinion, not only not of the best sort for a statesman, but precisely of the very worst sort: of that sort which unfits him, absolutely unfits him for the management of great and weighty affairs; and, when you add to this his restless, his audacious, his insolent ambition, which he sucked in with his political milk, and which has its rise in the notion, that the talent of talking is the first of human talents; when you add this to the other disqualifications, it must, I think, be evident, that the loss of such a man is a gain to any ministry. Of one thing I am quite sure, and that is, that though the new-modelled ministry may go on as badly as Mr. Canning did, with respect to the foreign affairs, it is impossible that they should go on worse; for, whether we look to Spain or Austria, the only two countries where he had it in his power to do much mischief, we shall be convinced, that, if the choice had been left to the emperor Napoleon, he would have chosen for us a minister that should have adopted just such measures as those, which have proceeded from the "intellect" of Mr. Canning, who (and that is saying all of him in one word) was one of the *legacies* which Pitt bequeathed to England.—There are two or three ques-

tions now in agitation amongst politicians, upon which I shall venture to offer my opinion. The first of which is, whether the Marquis Wellesley will yield to the invitation, said to be sent out to him, and join the new-modelled ministry. If he does, it will be owing to the situation, in which events have placed his brother, the Baron Douro; for, otherwise, there are abundant reasons why he should not; and, if the Baron can show, as Sir John Moore could, that his march into the heart of Spain was not voluntary, but was forced upon him, I am decidedly of opinion, that he will not join the ministry. Upon the whole, I think he will not, and, in that case, they will certainly find it more difficult to stand, because such a refusal on his part will be, with the wavering (of which there must be many) a signal for defection.

—Another question is, whether the Opposition will take Mr. Canning into their ranks. Some of them would gladly do it, for they would associate themselves with any one capable of giving them the smallest share of even temporary aid. But, some others will be very slow to admit him, seeing how troublesome an inmate he has constantly been. He has always had several persons, when in power with him, whom he has been known to dislike, and against whom he has evidently had a grudge. Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Perceval, Mr. Addington; in short, every one that stood between him and the light. It must ever be thus with a man of greedy ambition, who must always be a teasing companion, especially when of a turn so satirical as Mr. Canning is. Such a man's "hand is against every man, and every man's hand is against him." So that, in spite of the *flirtation*, as it is called (borrowing a term from another species of prostitution and applying it to politics); in spite of the flirtation of the *Morning Chronicle*, I should not be very much surprised to see Mr. Canning, during the next session of parliament, occupying a corner of an empty bench, or, at least, making one of a party uncommonly select; and, if this should be the case, he must muster up his philosophy, and wait for "better times," when his "*NEW MORALITY*" shall have gained a greater number of disciples.—I do not know whether the same idea may have struck any of the members of the Opposition; but, I cannot help thinking, that, if there be one thing, which, above all others, the ministers ought to wish for,

it is, that the Opposition should receive Mr. Canning, and march him on, at once, in a furious charge against his late colleagues; for, in that case, even the people, who have, in fact, no interest at all in the warfare of the factions, would, to a man, be on the side of the ministers.—The last question, which, at present, I shall notice is, whether the ministry, as it is now constituted, will be able to keep their ground; and, here, it is clear, that much must depend upon the conduct of the adversary; but, I cannot see why they should *not* keep their ground; for, they have, it is evident, the perfect good will of the king, and as to *the people*, they desire no change at all, unless there be *a change of system*, being thoroughly convinced, from the experience of the last fifty years, that a change of ministry is a mere shifting of the power and emoluments of the several offices in the state, from one set of men to another, *with the certain evil of adding to the burthen of the taxes by the grant of a long list of new pensions*. In short, a change of ministry is now-a-days regarded, and justly regarded, as the forerunner of *a new tax*; and the people think that they have already quite taxes enough. That the thing should be viewed in this light; that this opinion should generally prevail, may be mortifying to the traders in party politics, but such *is* the opinion, and such it will be, until there be a radical change in the system, and that change can be wrought only by a house of parliament, really the representatives of the people; and, I do think, that even the most inveterate non-reformist will not deny, that, if there had been such a house of parliament, we never should have heard of the dirty intrigue, which has led to the making of these observations.

**TALAVERA'S CAMPAIGN.**—The news from our army in Spain, appears fully to confirm that statement which was published in the Register of the 14th instant, at page 520; and the chief fact in which was, that more than one half of the remains of the army were upon the *sick list*.—The French now tell us, why their generals did not continue the pursuit of our army into Portugal. Their reason was, that it was better to leave our people to the exterminating influence of those *diseases*, which were sure to fasten upon them in the provinces, whither they were marching. There *might* be some other reason besides this; but this was a very good

one; and especially as they had the game so completely in their hands, that to destroy Douro's army, totally to annihilate it, was an object not worth even a trifling risk of lives.—Upon Baron Douro's conduct, during the campaign, the *Moniteur* has made some very just, though very severe remarks, in the way of Notes upon his dispatch from Truxillo, which Notes were inserted in the Register, at page 567. It is there observed, that Douro's complaint against Cuesta, was ill-founded; and that, if the latter had *not* quitted Talavera, he *would have been lost*.—In these Notes, which contain what *Europe* will believe relating to this campaign, our Baron and Viscount is spoken of in a way very different indeed from that, in which he is spoken of in the famous **GENERAL ORDER**. The French say, "*We wish 'Lord Wellesley' (meaning Baron Douro) 'to command the English armies.'*" They laugh at his tactics, and at that "*military 'resource,'*" which the **GENERAL ORDER** gave him.—Upon the subject of his post in the retreat, the French have some remarks, which I cannot refrain from inserting here, because they exactly correspond with what I said upon the same subject.—"*Lord Wellington had abandoned the army of Cuesta, who had been 'beaten on the Tagus, and lost 35 pieces of cannon, and all his ammunition.—The writer asks, why the French did not pursue the English army? They did pursue it, for they came up with the rear-guard. This rear-guard, it is true, was composed 'only of the troops of Cuesta; but they 'were there as allied troops, and made a 'part of the pursued army. The French, 'too, destroyed that division, which they 'overtook. Two things certainly result from this: 1st, That the rear-guard of 'Lord Wellington was destroyed; 2ndly, 'That Lord Wellington, having to give 'the post of honour either to the English 'troops, or those Spaniards of whom he 'speaks so ill, determined in favour of the 'Spanish troops. The post of honour in 'an army is that which is nearest the 'enemy. When Francis the First sent to 'redemand the sword of Constable from 'the Constable of Bourbon, the latter replied, 'the King took it from me on 'the day when he gave the command 'of the advanced guard to the Duke 'of Alençon.' Lord Wellington had not 'the same sentiments with the brave 'Chevaliers of those times. He does not*"



"pique himself on keeping for himself the post of honour, he gives it up to his allies." —It is impossible to get out of this. There is no rebutting the charge. It is so manifestly just, that it will not admit of a moment's dispute. Yes, the noble Baron, who, as the French say, speaks so ill of the Spaniards, did most generously cede to them the post of honour at the Bridge of Arzobispo. He gave up the post of honour to them, having, apparently, been glutted with honour of that sort at the battle of Talavera. To be serious, it is very ill-treatment of the Spaniards to represent them as of no use at all in the campaign, at the same time that we are making them cover our retreat; for that was, as is now evident, the real state of the case.—Upon the subject, too, of Douro's want of provisions, the *Moniteur* has some cutting remarks:—"The pretext of wanting provisions is always the excuse of *Generals who are beaten*, or who are rendered unable to attempt any thing. Would not one suppose Lord Wellington commanded an army of 300,000 infantry, and 40,000 cavalry? When a General has an army so considerable, the procuring of provisions may give him some trouble, but cannot absolutely stop his progress. Can it be believed, that an army of 26,000 men could not find subsistence in a country where towns are so numerous? Such an army is only a strong division, which a single town of Spain could maintain for two months. Besides, if Lord Wellington was uneasy with respect to the subsistence of his army, why did he abandon his magazines? His line of operation and his magazines were upon and at Placentia. Why did he suffer Placentia to be taken? Why? Because this GENERAL OF SEPOYS had the imprudence to advance to the very middle of Spain, without knowing either what force was before him, or what upon his flanks.—We see by his dispatches that he sometimes believed that the Duke of Dalmatia had but 8,000 men, and sometimes that he had 16,000. Under these false suppositions he had proposed to divide his forces to go and attack the Duke of Dalmatia, when all on a sudden, and too late, he learned that this same Duke was advancing upon him with a corps of 60,000 men. He then fled in the utmost haste, and he was in the right. Had he been amused at Talavera, instead of being attacked, and had

"not particular and local circumstances permitted him to pass the Tagus, and escape by sacrificing the corps which he left behind him, not a soldier of his army would have again seen England. If ever there was a General wanting foresight, it is certainly Lord Wellington. If he should long command the English armies, we may flatter ourselves with obtaining great advantages from the brilliant combinations of a General so inexperienced in the trade of war".—Yet, this is the man, upon whom we bestow a brace of titles at a time, and whom we cry up as worthy of a place in the very first rank of British heroes.—It is, I think, pretty evident, that a very small portion of our army will, in the end, escape. We get no official accounts of this army, though packets are continually arriving from Portugal; and, by-and-by, after due time has been allowed for leaking out the facts, the official statement will come, bolstered up at head and foot with falsehoods in a demi-official form. Thus will the nation be again deluded.—It should always be borne in mind, that the titles were bestowed upon Douro after the ministers had in their possession the facts relating to the retreat from Talavera, or, at least, after they were possessed of what must have convinced them, that the retreat must immediately take place, and, of course, that the General, upon whom the titles were conferred, had, to give it the mildest term, been guilty of great indiscretion. They must, at the very moment when they were advising the king to bestow the honours upon him, have known, that he would be compelled either to yield himself and his army prisoners of war, or to flee with a degree of haste that would not permit him to carry off his sick and wounded. And, yet they advised the king to make him, at once, a Baron and a Viscount; to bestow upon him greater honours than were bestowed upon him who gained the Battle of the Nile.—It appears from these observations in the *Moniteur*, that the Duke of Dalmatia (Soult) had, in the rear of Baron Douro an army of sixty thousand men. Now, it will be remembered, that the Baron tells us, that he quitted Talavera, with the English part of the army, in order to go and meet Soult, and to "do his business effectually." We know, indeed, that, instead of doing this, he fled across the Tagus, long before he came within reach of Soult; but, what I wish to point out to the reader is, the extreme improbability of his ever having

intended to march against Soult, seeing that Soult had 60,000 men, and that Douro must, being then so near to him, have known the amount of Soult's army. There always appeared to me something very strange and inconsistent in this movement from Talavera for the express purpose of attacking Soult and "*doing his business effectually*;" and then, instead of this, getting across the Tagus, with all possible dispatch, lest Soult should come up with him; but, if we suppose, that the Baron was duly informed of the amount of the force which the *Moniteur* says Soult had, this part of the Baron's conduct was perfectly wise, and leaves us nothing to lament, except, indeed, that he should have told Cuesta that he was going to meet Soult and to do his business effectually, and thereupon have left the poor Spaniard, together with his own sick and wounded, to the mercy of the French.—This is a part of the transaction, which, I should think, must become a subject of inquiry in another way. The Baron, in his official dispatches, *blames the Spanish general for quitting Talavera*, which he himself has left in order to seek out and to attack Soult; and, instead of attacking Soult, he gets out of Soult's way; he avoids him as one would avoid a lion; he crosses the Tagus, in order to get out of the reach of the army that he went to attack; and, to crown the whole, he continues his retreat, covered by the army of Cuesta, covered by that very army, of whom and of whose general he speaks with so little respect.—Take it all together I cannot help thinking, that this is the most disgraceful campaign that was made by an English army, and this the most disgraceful year, known to England from the beginning of her history.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—If it be true, that peace is actually concluded between France and Austria, the affairs of Spain and Portugal are not far distant from the epoch of their final settlement; and, indeed, from all appearances, the army which the French already have in the Peninsula, would be quite sufficient for the purpose.

—The scheme of concentrating the authority and energy of the government in Spain does not seem to be taken in very good part, especially by the JUNTA, whom, it seems, the concentrating scheme would completely cashier; and people like to be in office, in Spain as well as in England.

—There is in Spain a body, called the

SUPREME COUNCIL OF SPAIN AND THE INDIES, which has presented an Address to the Supreme Junta, beseeching the said Junta to put an end to their own power, and to erect a *Regency* in the person of the Archbishop of Toledo. One passage of this Address will suffice to give us a pretty correct notion of the ultimate object of its authors.—It is drawn up under the whimsical notion, that, in addressing the Supreme Junta, the parties are addressing Ferdinand VII. It is, to be sure, quite farcical to hear the minister of war telling the generals, that "His Majesty" has ordered them to be assured of this or of that, when it is notorious, that he (poor fellow!) is in the safe custody of Napoleon's dragoons. However, this is the way in which they choose to talk; and, in this sort of style the Supreme Council addresses the Junta:—"The people are indulging in unrestrained complaints, and make them known by libellous and inflammatory placards. Their daily conversations, in places of the greatest resort, suppose different parties, views, and interests among their governors, and threaten some, whilst they insult others, forgetful of the respect due to the supreme authority, and regardless of the consequences to the public peace and union.—The Council shudders upon contemplating the danger in which it sees the country, because it cannot foresee the possible results of this ferment, which, while it meets with its utmost disapprobation, as contrary to law, at the same time excites its apprehensions on account of the opposite interests of the Juntas, and of the variety it observes in their opinions; and also because it is generally known, that the law, in cases like this, directs that the government be entrusted to one, three or five individuals. The Supreme Junta is, therefore, bound by the most sacred duty to lay these truths before your Majesty, in order to ward off the dangers by which we are threatened, and to prevent the excesses of a people who think their defence and protection unattended to.—In your Majesty resides the Sovereign power; the remedy is in your own hands. A generous self-denial will perpetuate the memory of the services of the Supreme Junta, and immortalize its Members. May it please your Majesty to restore to the law its authority; and there will be an end of the uneasiness to which we are a prey, and which will be succeeded by tranquillity and



"applause.—The immediate appoint-  
 "ment of a provisional Government will  
 "pacify the people; the nation will in-  
 "dulge in the most flattering hopes; and  
 "the supreme will of Ferdinand VII, who  
 "requires it, and who suffers most, will be  
 "fully complied with.—The whole na-  
 "tion will applaud the measure; and it is  
 "the opinion of the Council, that, in order  
 "to rouse the spirit depressed by the pre-  
 "sent load of evils, it would be proper to  
 "establish a legal government, with a  
 "Bourbon at its head. And the perfidy  
 "of our infamous enemy having left in  
 "Spain none but the Most Reverend Car-  
 "dinal Archbishop of Toledo and Seville,  
 "it seems as if Heaven had preserved him  
 "to support the nation under her calamities,  
 "and continually to call to our minds the  
 "beloved Sovereign for whom we are fight-  
 "ing.—Policy points out the urgency of  
 "immediately filling up that seat, until  
 "the wished-for return of our Monarch.  
 "—His Eminence's elevated character  
 "leaves no room for competition, and  
 "silences all possible pretensions of either  
 "natives or foreigners. Spain and the  
 "Indies will obey him with enthusiastic  
 "devotion; all rivalry will be at an end;  
 "and the Spaniards will see in his Excel-  
 "lency a branch of the family of the  
 "King whom they so passionately love.  
 "—The better to ensure the success  
 "of his administration, and also to ease  
 "him of part of the burden, four Adjuncts  
 "ought to be given him, of different  
 "ranks and professions, provisionally to  
 "compose the Government until the next  
 "meeting of the Cortes. Whatever mat-  
 "ter comes under discussion, every ques-  
 "tion should be decided by a majority  
 "of votes; and they should swear to ob-  
 "serve our laws, which are not to be  
 "altered without the concurrence of the  
 "Cortes, which the Government should  
 "convene as circumstances permit.—  
 "Upon this subject, the Supreme Council  
 "of Spain and the Indies will prepare its  
 "observations, and lay them before the  
 "Government as usual. It is just and requi-  
 "site that our American settlements should  
 "have a principal share in this national  
 "body, as they derive such strong titles  
 "to our regard from their fidelity, loyal  
 "services, donations, attachment to the  
 "King, patriotic zeal, and great import-  
 "ance. This Supreme Tribunal reserves  
 "to itself to give its opinion upon the  
 "justice of their intervention, which it  
 "will do after the most mature delibera-

"tion.—It is supposed that the four in-  
 "dividuals to be appointed by the Su-  
 "preme Junta until the Meeting of the  
 "National Congress, will bear a high  
 "character for probity, religion, loyalty,  
 "skill in their respective professions, im-  
 "partiality, and disinterestedness. The  
 "Supreme Junta itself, which they are to  
 "succeed in the exercise of the sovereign-  
 "ty, will secure the opinion of the pub-  
 "lic, and provide for its own safety, by  
 "appointing individuals endued with these  
 "qualities; for, if the persons elected  
 "should not rank high in the public opi-  
 "nion, Government would scarcely suc-  
 "ceed in suppressing the present popular  
 "complaints and suspicions. By so doing,  
 "no doubt will remain in the minds of  
 "the people about the upright intentions  
 "of the Supreme Junta; the superior  
 "ones will cease to exercise their  
 "powers; they will obtain the applause  
 "of the whole Monarchy; and posterity  
 "will ever be grateful for their services.  
 "—May it please your Majesty to lend  
 "a gracious hearing to this Representa-  
 "tion, which has no other object than  
 "your Majesty's glory, and the extermi-  
 "nation of the Tyrant by whom we are  
 "oppressed!"—The short and long of  
 "this rigmarole Address is, that there is, or  
 "at least, was, an intrigue going on for  
 "the purpose of ousting the Junta, and  
 "erecting, by degrees, a new monarch,  
 "under the shew of a regency. Of the  
 "character of this intended monarch we  
 "shall speak a little presently; but, in the  
 "meanwhile, it is to be observed, that no  
 "one, whether Junta or Council or Regent,  
 "says a word about the *liberties* of the peo-  
 "ple. Not a word. Upon that topic they  
 "are all as silent as the grave.—As to the  
 "result of all these intrigues there can be  
 "no doubt in the mind of any rational  
 "man; but, it is of some interest for us to  
 "mark their progress, and especially to  
 "note what part our government appears to  
 "have in them.—There is a letter, pub-  
 "lished in the Morning Chronicle of the  
 "21st instant, purporting to be written by  
 "a Spaniard at RONDA, in which Lord Wel-  
 "lesley is said to be *reported* to be decidedly  
 "in favour of a Regency, in the person of  
 "the Archbishop of Toledo. The Editor  
 "of the Morning Chronicle does not an-  
 "swer for the correctness of this letter;  
 "but, it is worthy of remark, that the Ad-  
 "dress of the SUPREME COUNCIL, from which  
 "I have given an extract above, is dated on  
 "the 26th of August last, about a fortnight,

or three weeks, after the arrival of Lord Wellesley at Seville.—Of the Archbishop of Toledo the abovementioned letter speaks in the following terms:—"No good Spaniard will lament the downfall of the narrow and impolitic system, which the Junta has so fatally pursued; and, if Lord Wellesley lends the powerful influence of his name and nation for the restoration of our long lost liberties, and the admittance of our people to their just and natural weight in their own concerns, he will confer greater obligations on Spain, than she owes even to the munificence of your Treasury, or the valour of your arms.—But alas! such is not the report which has reached me—I cannot, and I will not, however, believe what I am told, but it has been confidently asserted, that upon the pretext of concentrating authority, it is Lord Wellesley's intention to force the Archbishop of Toledo upon us as a Regent. This would be concentrating authority with a vengeance, it would be concentrating not only the authority, but the folly, the bigotry, and the inefficiency of the Junta into a focus. The Conde de Chinchon, son of the Infant Don Louis, brother of the Princess of the Peace, and Archbishop of Toledo and Seville, is destitute of every talent, surrounded by the basest of mankind, and in every way calculated to entail ridicule and failure upon any Government committed to his charge."

—Well, and what of that? What of all that, I should be glad to know? What if he be a notorious fool, a notorious bigot, notoriously inefficient; what if he be destitute of every talent; what if he be surrounded by the basest of mankind; what if he would seem to have been created for the express purpose of entailing ridicule upon any government committed to his care: what reason is there in all that against his being Regent, aye, or King, if need be? I leave this question to be answered by the Pastry-cook Alderman, by the place-hunting Dixons, or by any of the crew of holy-altar and life-and-fortune and last-shilling and last-drop-of-blood men, who are now infesting the country with their harangues; and I shall take my leave of the Spaniards, for this time, with observing, that, as it was foreseen from the beginning by me and by many others, there will be a revolution; that if there is to be a king, it will be a king of a new dynasty; that the nobility and the opulent in Spain have this choice, and this choice

only, a new government of the people's own making, or a sovereign set over them by the Emperor of France; that, in either case, the change will be not only highly beneficial to Spain, but to all the nations, with which Spain has any connection; and, finally, that if any thing had been wanting to convince all rational men, that the cause of the Supreme Junta was not the cause of the people of Spain, that conviction would have been produced by the recent decrees against the press, appointing a Censor on the news-papers, and a Public Prosecutor to bring writers, printers, and book-sellers to what is called justice, and, in short, putting the Spanish press upon the same footing as the press in Calcutta. While decrees of this stamp are issuing from Seville, King Joseph is issuing from Madrid, decrees of a very different description; decrees for putting down the monkish establishments, and, in a word, for improving the condition of the people.

JUBILEE.—There is every reason to suppose, that a peace is now concluded between France and Austria; that is to say, that the latter has, in due form, submitted to the domination of the former, which former, be it observed, the King has, upon a very recent occasion, declared to be our inveterate enemy. Well, then, here is our most powerful friend and ally, bent down, at last, beneath this our enemy. But, it is towards the events, now naturally to be expected, that we are to look; for, the subduing of Austria is, in fact, the mere signal for the great and steady proceedings against England. Napoleon may now be regarded as having the whole of the continent of Europe at his absolute command, Spain and Portugal only excepted; and, were not those countries assisted with the statesman-like advice and the military skill and prowess of the Wellesleys, to complete their subjugation would certainly not cost him many months; nay, there are those who appear to believe, that both the noble Marquis and his brother the Baron will find it their duty to come home, in order to give their personal aid to their sovereign and his government, and that this move will take place before Napoleon will be able to get back to Spain. If this should be the case; if Spain and Portugal should be thus deprived of the talents of the heroes of Calcutta and Talavera, their doom is sealed at once. In short, when we see the Wellesleys come away, we may be sure, that, in their opinion



at least, the *house is about to fall*. But, whether they come away or remain, the short of the matter is, that, with the exception, perhaps, of the pensioned poet, Fitzgerald, the editor of the fast-sinking Morning Post, and a few such ones, there is nobody who does not expect to see Joseph Buonaparté as much master of Spain and Portugal, by the end of this year, as his brother Louis is master of Holland, or, as George the Third is master of England. This being the general opinion, a question, which every man ought to put to himself is, *shall we then be able to defend ourselves against this conqueror?* He will have, under his absolute command, every sea-port in the world capable of being greatly mischievous to this country; and, at the same time, he will have all the means for building a hundred ships of the line in a year. At the end of one year from next Christmas, he will, in all probability, have *two hundred ships of the line fit to put to sea*. It is not more difficult for him to have a force like this, than for him to march an army to Vienna; and, that man must be a fool indeed, who supposes, that the Conqueror of Europe will want *inclination* to create such a force. Indeed, there is, I should suppose, even in these times of madness, no one so mad, so very mad, as to suppose, that the Emperor Napoleon, when having finished the conquest of the continent, will say to himself, "come, that is enough; and, "I will not only leave England unat-tempted, but will amicably shake hands with her, and leave her in quiet possession of those means, which she has so frequently employed for the stirring up of other nations against me, and for the putting down me and all my family." No: even the Dixons and their pastry-cook co-operator; nay, I hardly believe, that poet Fitzgerald is so execrably stupid as to suppose this. No: that man must be staring mad, who does not see, that the serious warfare between England and France is only now beginning; that it is now the beginning of dangers; that all former and present dangers are trifling compared to those which are now about to menace us: of this truth every man of sense must be convinced, and yet this is the time when we are told to hold a national *Jubilee*; when, even on this very day, on which I am writing this article, all the means of intoxication have been applied to the thoughtless part of the people; and, as if we were in love with

warlike failure and disgrace, we answer with cannonades of joy, those which the enemy, from the opposite coast, is firing in token of the completion of a peace won by his skill and valour, while we have before our eyes the miserable adventures upon the Scheldt and the Tagus. We appear to have lost all shame; to be so far from that *sheepish* people, that we were formerly thought, that we may now with much more propriety become famous for our senseless impudence. The poet, when he drew the character of Bobadil, made him hang down his head after having taken a drubbing; for, he did not suppose that it was in human nature for a boaster to continue on in his boastings; and that, too, with an increase of brass, after having become notoriously a beaten thing. Look at the Scheldt; look at the banks of the Tagus; look at the droves of English prisoners of war, who are, at this very moment, traversing France on their way to a prison; I do not say, look back, but look at what is, on this very day, and then tell me, if you believe, that any nation upon the face of the earth ever thought of a Jubilee under such circumstances. —It is, however, fitting that it should be known, that the nation, properly so called; that is, that the *sense* of the nation disapproves of this measure. It appears, from a letter, published by the Mayor of Glasgow, that underhand means to *feel the pulses of corporate bodies*, as to the keeping of a Jubilee, were resorted to so early as about the middle of August. The Jews and Contractors in the City were the first *openly* to propose the thing, and, as the public will bear in mind, the proposition was as openly opposed by every sound and sensible man in the Common Council. Grand dinners and feastings amongst the rich contractors and jobbers were, at first, the intention; but, fear soon suggested, amongst these gentry, the hypocritical pretence of a desire *to relieve the poor*; just as if they could not, if they had been so disposed, have relieved the poor on any other day, as well as on the 25th of October, 1809. —Thus the thing originated, and that the main object of the Jews and Contractors was to amuse the people, to keep them, as long as possible, from seeing their real situation, there can be no doubt. —There is a man of the name of *Drummond*, who is, it appears, the commandant of a corps of Volunteers in Westminster, called the Prince of Wales's Loyal Volunteers, who has published a Let-

ter, or Order, to his corps, in which he clearly imputes *disloyalty* to every one of the corps, who intentionally is absent from parade on that day. This man, who is, it is said, *the king's banker*, has said no more than others: and, the fact is, that, either in direct or indirect terms, the Jews, Jobbers, Contractors, Nabobs, Pensioners, and Sinecure-placemen, who have put themselves forward upon this occasion, have charged with *disloyalty* all those who disapproved of the measure, which charge, if it were not false, would be dreadfully ominous to the royal family; for, I will venture to say, that the measure is decidedly disapproved of by those who possess nine hundred and ninety nine parts out of every thousand of the sense, the talents, the virtue, and the property of the country.—There is to be a grand *naval and military promotion*, it seems, when we have already ten times as many admirals, perhaps, as are employed, and when we have *more generals than Buonaparté has*. These newly promoted people will, of course, *rejoice*; and so will the sailors who are to have a *double allowance of drink*; and so will the soldiers who are to be released from *dungeons and jails*; and so will all those, who, at the expence of others, are to be *crammed and made drunk*, and who will sing and bawl out the praises of those who stuff and who drench them.—To read the accounts in the news-papers, to read the exultations at the prospect of the feeding and drinking of this day, foreigners must look upon us as having lived upon hips and haws for the last forty-nine years. We appear to be a people, a very great part of whom are actually *starving*. We seem to be preparing *one single meal* of victuals and drink for the king's subjects, as it were by way of making up for a life of starvation; and, when these fed people set up a *shouting for joy at feeling the effects of a belly-full*, we are to proclaim it to the world as a proof of national *loyalty*; and, what is more, as a proof of the people's having been happy, having enjoyed *prosperity*, for the last forty nine years!—To be added to this, and to the grand naval and military promotion, there is but one thing wanting, and that is a new swarm of knights to match those made upon the occasion of Peg Nicholson. This would render the thing quite complete, and, therefore, it is pity it should be left out. A set of *Jubilee knights*, scattered over the country, would

be the thing, of all others, wherewith to crown the whole transaction.—In the mean while, Buonaparté keeps steadily on. We cannot shout *him* down. We cannot, with all our boasting and toasting, turn him aside from any one of his objects. While those who fatten upon the taxes here, are giving the ignorant and the hungry victuals and drink, in order to make them shout for joy, whole nations, unbought with either bread or beer, are proclaiming their admiration of our enemy. He, I'll warrant him, will make no Jubilee Knights; nor will he, unless he should want them for real services, add to the number of those persons, who are already a heavy expence to his people.—I remember very well, that, when Buonaparté's coronation took place, our newspapers ascribed all the rejoicings at Paris to the *means used by the government*. Oh! how they abused the new Emperor for purchasing the shouts of the ignorant and venal with the money wrung from the sensible and honest and industrious part of the French nation: How repeatedly and how sincerely did they pity the good people of that country, who were, as they said, compelled to put on a face of joy, while their hearts were full of grief! And, who can have forgotten, that within these six weeks, they attributed the general illumination at Madrid, and even the *Te Deum* sung in the churches, to the *fears*, the *selfishness*, or the *hypocrisy* of the people, who partook in it.—Well, then, will they *now* repeat, that the rejoicings at Madrid were the effects of the basest of all human feelings? Will they *now* assert, as boldly as before, that it was blasphemy to sing the *Te Deum* upon such an occasion? I think they will now be a little more cautious how they speak upon the subject of those rejoicings, which take place in honour of other sovereigns.—I shall now have done with this Jubilee, which has been attended with this good, at any rate, it has led to discussions, by the means of which the people of this country, who are always too ready to *forget*, have been reminded of many things, many acts and events of the king's reign, which had sunk into oblivion amidst the uproar of the last seventeen years, and which, added to the acts and events of those seventeen years, cannot fail, in due time, to produce excellent effects.

WM. COBBETT.

Coleshill, Wednesday, 25 Oct. 1809.